Written employment contracts may improve the conditions of agricultural workers in developing countries, but farmers as employers often prefer less formal oral arrangements. We evaluate whether farmers’ preferences, which are deeply rooted in traditional norms, can be influenced through a group awareness campaign. In a randomised experiment in Côte d’Ivoire, we show that such a campaign increases farmers’ preferences for written contracts and for contract features involving social benefits for workers.
Iron deficiency is a widespread nutritional problem in developing countries, causing impaired physical activity and cognitive development, as well as maternal mortality. Although food fortification and supplementation programmes have been effective in some countries, their overall success remains limited. Biofortification, that is, breeding crops for higher micronutrient content, is a relatively new approach. We propose a methodology for ex-ante impact assessment of iron biofortification, which builds on disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) and a large household data set.
Smallholder farmers in developing countries often suffer from high risk and limited market access. Contract farming may improve the situation under certain conditions. Several studies analyzed effects of contracts on smallholder productivity and income with mixed results. Most existing studies focused on one particular contract scheme. Contract characteristics rarely differ within one scheme, so little is known about how different contract characteristics may influence the benefits for smallholders.
Micronutrient malnutrition is a public health problem in many regions of the developing world. Severe vitamin A and iron deficiencies are of particular concern due to their high prevalence and their serious, multiple health effects on humans. This paper examines dietary patterns and nutrient intakes, as well as their socioeconomic determinants among households in the Philippines.
This paper considers genetically modified (GM) seed adoption decisions by farmers in a developing country under two alternative information regimes (with and without perfect information regarding production conditions) that allows the monopolist producer of GM seeds to either practice perfect discrimination or uniform pricing. Under each regime we analyze two scenarios: when the government can and cannot credibly commit to the announced form of welfare enhancing intervention in the domestic seed market.