This paper considers genetically modified (GM) seed adoption decisions by farmers in a developing country under two alternative information regimes (with and without perfect information regarding production conditions) that allows the monopolist producer of GM seeds to either practice perfect discrimination or uniform pricing. Under each regime we analyze two scenarios: when the government can and cannot credibly commit to the announced form of welfare enhancing intervention in the domestic seed market.
This paper is a contribution to the establishment of a new capacity development (CD) 9 strategy, a process that the Consortium Office will facilitate, with external input, during 2013. The paper explores the lessons learned from CGIAR’s experience with CD and reflects the findings of a working group that was brought together in late 2012. The objective of the paper is to identify the roles that individual and institutional CD might play in CGIAR in order to increase CGIAR’s impact on the welfare of smallholder farmers and the sustainability of their farming systems.
Classical innovation adoption models implicitly assume homogenous information flow across farmers, which is often not realistic. As a result, selection bias in adoption parameters may occur. We focus on tissue culture (TC) banana technology that was introduced in Kenya more than 10 years ago. Up till now, adoption rates have remained relatively low.