Maize production is of critical importance to smallholder farmers in Ghana. Various factors limit the productivityof smallholder maize farming systems undergirded by the lack of capital for critical investments both at the farmand at national policy levels. Using a value chain approach, this diagnostic study explains how a complex configuration of actor interaction within an institutionally and agro-ecologically challenged value chain leads tothe enduring absence of maize farming credit support.
This presentation addresses the topic of sustainable agricultural intensification and gender- and age-biased land tenure systems in Africa.
The importance of extension services in helping smallholder farmers to address the many challenges of agricultural production cannot be over-emphasized. However, relatively few studies have been conducted that investigate how the capacities of agricultural extension agents can be built to more effectively assist smallholder farmers in managing climate risks and impacts. As climate change is a key threat to smallholder food production, addressing this issue is increasingly important.
Contract farming has gained in importance in many developing countries. Previous studies analysed effects of contracts on smallholder farmers’ welfare, yet mostlywithout considering that different types of contractual relationships exist. Here, we examine associations between contract farming and farm household income in the oilpalm sector of Ghana, explicitly differentiating between two types of contracts,namely simple marketing contracts and more comprehensive resource-providing contracts.
The concept of an innovation platform is increasingly used in interventions inspired by agricultural innovation systems thinking, as a way of bringing stakeholders from a sector together to enable transformative change. An essential role on such innovation platforms is thought to be that of the ‘innovation champion’, but this role has so far not been unravelled.
In the existing literature, the effects of contract farming on household welfare were examined with mixed results. Most studies looked at single contract types. This paper contributes to the literature by comparing two types of contracts – simple marketing contracts and resource- providing contracts – in the Ghanaian oil palm sector. We investigate the effects of both contracts on farm income, as well as spillovers on other household income sources. We use survey data collected with an innovative sampling design and a control function approach to address possible issues of endogeneity.
Smallholder farmers in developing countries often suffer from high risk and limited market access. Contract farming may improve the situation under certain conditions. Several studies analyzed effects of contracts on smallholder productivity and income with mixed results. Most existing studies focused on one particular contract scheme. Contract characteristics rarely differ within one scheme, so little is known about how different contract characteristics may influence the benefits for smallholders.
Integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) has been promoted by research and philanthropic organizations as well as governments in an attempt to increase crop yields and improve livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Africa. As this has largely been a continent-wide initiative, it is surprising that there is still scant information on its impact on crop yields and household income. This paper uses a counterfactual model to assess ISFM impact on yields and total household incomes using farm household data from Tamale (northern Ghana) and Kakamega (western Kenya).
Ghana’s cocoa production belt also serves as the main forests repository of the country. Cocoa farm- ing is both a direct and indirect driver of deforesta- tion in Ghana (UNEP, 2008). This implies that critical interventions are needed to deal with deforestation emanating from cocoa production.
We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights oninvestment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. Weshow that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local politicalhierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequencethey invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output.The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a givenindividual corresponds to that individual’s security of tenure overthose specific plots and, in turn, to the individual’s position in thepolitical hierarchy relevant to those specific plot